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This paper o⁄ers an explanation for audit committee failures within a corporate gover-
nance context. We consider a setting in which the management of a ￿rm sets up ￿nancial
statements that are possibly biased. These statements are reviewed/audited by an external
auditor and by an audit committee. Both agents report the result of their audit, the auditor
acting ￿rst. The auditor and the audit committee use an imperfect auditing technology. As
a result of their work they privately observe a signal regarding the quality of the ￿nancial
statements. The probability for a correct signal in the sense that an unbiased report is la-
beled correct and a biased one incorrect, depends on the type of the agent. Good as well as
bad agents exist in the economy. Importantly, two good agents observe identical informative
signals while the signal observed by a bad agent is uninformative and uncorrelated to those
of other good or bad agents.The audit committee as well as the auditor are anxious to build
up reputation regarding their ability in the labor market. Given this predominate goal they
report on the signal in order to maximize the market￿ s assessment of their ability. At the
end of the game the true character of the ￿nancial statements is revealed to the public with
some positive probability. The market uses this information along with the agents￿reports
to update beliefs about the agents￿types. We show that a herding equilibrium exists in
which the auditor reports based on his signal but the audit committee ￿herds￿and follows
the auditor￿ s judgement no matter what its own insights suggest. This results holds even
if the audit committee members are held liable for detected failure. However, performance
based bonus payments induce truthful reporting at least in some cases.
Keywords: corporate governance, audit committee, game theory, herding, incentive con-
tracts
￿A former version of the paper was titled "Corporate Governance, Reputation Concers, and Herd Behavior".
We acknowledge helpful comments by Joel Demski, Jack Stecher, Alfred Wagenhofer, and by participants at the
Accounting Research Workshop 2007 in Fribourg and the VHB conference 2009 in Nuremberg.
11 Introduction
Over the past decade institutions in various countries made considerable e⁄orts in order to
improve corporate governance structures. For instance the "Sarbanes Oxley Act" (SOX) resulted
from such e⁄ort in the US, "The Combined Code: Principles of Good Governance and Code
of Best Practice" in the UK, and the "German Code of Corporate Governance" (GCCG) in
Germany. The list could be extended easily.1
One of the main objectives of these regulations is to improve the quality of ￿nancial reporting.
To achieve this, special attention has been devoted to audit committees and the way they are
composed. For instance ￿rms listed at the NYSE are required to maintain audit committees
composed of all independent directors.2 In addition the SOX requires these ￿rms to disclose
to the SEC whether they have a ￿nancial expert on the audit committee.3 Similar regulations
apply in Germany. In particular the German Stock Companies Act requires that at least one
independent ￿nancial expert serves on the supervisory board of listed companies. Moreover, the
GCCG recommends to set up an audit committee as a sub-committee of the supervisory board
whose chairman should be a ￿nancial expert.4
The underlying idea of such recommendations of course is that independent and highly quali￿ed
audit committee members would e⁄ectively monitor the reporting process of a ￿rm, detect audit
errors, report their ￿ndings truthfully, and thus enhance reporting quality.
To provide some anecdotal but well documented evidence, e.g., the case of Enron seems to
be at odds with this idea. Enron￿ s audit committee comprised a number of independent and
presumably highly quali￿ed experts but obviously did not oppose to dubious accounting practices
of both, the management and the auditor.5 Certainly, this startling failure may be regarded as
an unfortunate, exceptional case in which an audit committee, highly quali￿ed and acting for
the best, was fooled for some reason. Alternatively, it might be worth it to consider the potential
existence of adverse incentives that persist after independence and adequate capabilities have
been ensured. Following the latter idea, we model audit committee members as economic agents
pursuing personal goals that are in potential con￿ ict with investors￿interests.
Speci￿cally, we assume that career concerns matter and that audit committee members aim
at building reputation in the labor market. This is in line with previous contributions to the
literature. E.g. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Zajac and Westphal (1996) state that a primary
incentive for outside directors to e⁄ectively monitor managers and their ￿nancial reporting is
to enhance reputation in the labor market for outside directors. Yermack (2004) empirically
quanti￿es that statement and ￿nds that 40% of total outside director incentives are related to
1For a comprehensive overview see http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php.
2For more details on speci￿c listing rules see Klein (2006), pp. 4f.
3See Sec. 407 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act.
4See §100 (5) of the German Stock Companies Act and section 5.3.2 of the German Corporate Governance
Code.
5See, e.g., Benston and Hargraves (2002), Demski (2002), Revsine (2002).
2reputation, which basically drives the chance to get and the risk to loose directorships.
Reputation, however, is likely to su⁄er severe damage if ￿nancial reporting failures are detected.
This manifests itself for instance in an signi￿cant increase in the number of board turnovers
and losses of other board positions of outside directors (audit committee members) following an
accounting restatement, as documented by Srinivasan (2005). A similar e⁄ect has been shown
for directors whose companies su⁄er bankruptcy (Gilson 1990).
In this paper, we add a particular aspect when we model the market￿ s response to ￿nancial
reporting failures. Basically, we assume that the reputational loss for an audit committee that
fails to detect ￿nancial fraud is less severe if the auditor is fooled, too, and vice versa. Moreover,
reputation of the audit committee is assumed to su⁄er extreme damage if the auditor does not
object to the ￿nancial statements presented by the management, the audit committee does so,
and ￿nally the ￿nancial statements turn out to be correct. The underlying idea is that with
both parties being fooled some ￿sharing the blame￿e⁄ect occurs that renders the labor market￿ s
reaction to a failure moderate. If only one is fooled, however, the one fooled su⁄ers great losses
while the other one￿ s reputation rises.
Our analysis is based on a learning model closely related to the one introduced by Scharfstein and
Stein (1990). We assume that in an economy an exogenously given percentage of the ￿nancial
statements is biased (does not comply with GAAP). The ￿nancial statements are audited by
an auditor and by an audit committee. "Auditing" in what follows is used in a broad sense
noticing that the auditor and the audit committee do not perform identical tasks. However,
the audit committee is supposed to do "auditing", too, as it closely follows and monitors the
reporting process. Both parties use imperfect auditing technologies and possibly get incorrect
results. They might either conclude from their audit that the ￿nancial statements are biased
even though they are correct or fail to detect an existing bias. Both parties have to report on
their audit. Importantly, the auditor acts ￿rst and thus bases his report on his ex ante beliefs
and the privately observed result of his audit. The audit committee acting second does the
same thing but additionally considers the auditor￿ s report when forming beliefs about the true
character of the ￿nancial statements.
Even though both parties are assumed to be well educated and quali￿ed, di⁄erent types of
auditors and audit committee members are assumed to exist. Good types act cleverly and pick
auditing strategies that provide them with valuable information. Thus they obtain informative
results from their audit. Bad ones fail to pick a fruitful strategy and the information received
from the audit is pure noise. Good types, however, are assumed to observe identical audit
results. The type of the auditor and audit committee in place, good or bad, is unknown to
everyone. At the end of the game, after both parties have reported, the true character of the
￿nancial statements is learned at least with some positive probability. For instance, certain
estimates underlying measurement and valuation of assets and debt might either turn out to
be correct on average or systematically biased. More dramatically, sudden restatements, as in
the case of Enron, WorldCom, and the like, may become necessary and thus discover previous
3misstatements.
Having learned the reports and possibly the quality of the ￿nancial statements, the labor market
updates beliefs regarding the type of the auditor and the audit committee. We show that if
both parties are anxious to build up reputation and report in order to maximize the market￿ s
assessment of their abilities, there is an incentive for the audit committee to herd and to mimic
the auditor￿ s report no matter what its private information indicates. This result holds even
if we extend our model and assume that audit committee members are held liable for detected
failure. Adding a bonus payment, however, in some cases cures herding incentives.
Our paper contributes to the literature on opportunistic board behavior. Previous theoretical
work on that issue includes Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Cyert et al. (2002), Bebchuk and
Fried (2003), Ozerturk (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Drymiotes (2007), and Sch￿ndube-
Pirchegger and Sch￿ndube (2009). Cyert et al., Bebchuk and Fried, and Ozerturk stress the
role of the board in determining CEO compensation and analyze e⁄ects of an agency con￿ ict
between the board and shareholders on such contracts. In Sch￿ndube-Pirchegger and Sch￿ndube
the board can additionally increase the CEO￿ s cost to bias a report via supervisory e⁄ort.
Hermalin and Weisbach investigate the e⁄ectiveness of monitoring as a function of the board￿ s
independence from the CEO. Drymiotes shows that a less independent board may increase the
e⁄ectiveness of monitoring the CEO and Adams and Ferreira demonstrate the superiority of a
less independent board when the board has two tasks: to monitor and to advise the CEO.
In contrast, this paper focuses on ￿nancial reporting control and refers to the audit committee
as the relevant institution to perform this task.
A similar focus can be found in several empirical papers. Triggered by the recent changes
as described above, e.g., Defond et. al. (2005) investigate whether appointments of outside
directors or ￿nancial experts to the audit committee is perceived as good news by the capital
market and thus leads to abnormal returns. Xie et. al. (2003), Klein (2006), and Carcello et.
al. (2006) study the relation between audit committee composition and earnings manipulation.
These papers ￿nd some evidence that better corporate governance structures are perceived to
work or indeed work, but naturally do not investigate underlying incentive e⁄ects explicitly.
Finally, the paper ties in with the literature on (reputational) herding.6 Previous research for
instance identi￿ed herd behavior among security analysts and investors.7 Herd behavior of audit
committee members to our best knowledge, has not been addressed in the literature so far.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. In section 3 we consider a
benchmark setting in which the auditor and the audit committee report based on their best
knowledge. Section 4 derives a herding equilibrium where the audit committee mimics the
auditor no matter what its personal beliefs are. Section 5 investigates measures to counteract
herding tendencies and section 6 sums up our ￿ndings.
6See Devenow and Welch (1996) for a survey over di⁄erent herding models in ￿nancial economics.
7See Welch (2000), Arya and Mittendorf (2005), and Scharfstein and Stein (1990), respectively.
42 The model
We assume that two types of managements exist in an economy. One type is innately honest and
reports truthfully complying with GAAP while the other one does not and biases the ￿nancial
report to his personal bene￿t. The ex ante probability for an honest type, ￿; is publicly known.
R 2 fRb;Rtg denotes the ￿nancial statement information to be reported by the management. t
refers to a truthful report of the honest management and b to a biased one.
The ￿nancial statements set up by the management are audited by an independent auditor and
by an audit committee. For simplicity we model the audit and its result in similar fashion for
both agents: The auditor and the audit committee perform an audit which results in a binary
privately observed signal sj 2 fsb;stg; j =A,AC. A refers to the auditor and AC to the audit
committee. The signal either claims that the ￿nancial statements are correct and truthful, st.
Or it claims that the report is biased and thus does not comply with GAAP, sb.
Both agents observe a signal but they do not necessarily observe the same one. Auditor and
audit committee are required to report on their audit, again in binary fashion: Mj 2 fMb;Mtg;
either they report that the ￿nancial statements are correct, Mt; or they report that they are
incorrect, Mb.
The information inherent in the private signal depends on the type of the observer which is
unknown ex ante to everyone. Two types of auditors and audit committees are assumed to
exist: good ones and bad ones, ￿j 2 fgood, badg. The probability of being good for both agents
is known to be ￿j = ￿.
If an agent is bad, the observed signal is pure noise such that
Pr(stjRt;bad) = Pr(stjRb;bad) = m
and
Pr(sbjRb;bad) = Pr(sbjRt;bad) = 1 ￿ m:
If one is good, the signal is informative with respect to the true character of the ￿nancial
statements. Thus the conditional probability to observe the signal st (sb) if Rt (Rb) is present




In addition we assume identical probabilities to observe the correct signal for good agents, no
matter whether the report is truthful or biased
Pr(stjRt;good) = Pr(sbjRb;good) = p:
5In turn the conditional probability to observe the wrong signal even though good is identical in
both states of nature, too:
Pr(stjRb;good) = Pr(sbjRt;good) = 1 ￿ p:
For the signal to be informative but imperfect we require 0:5 < p < 1.
Importantly, we assume that two good agents receive identical signals, while two bad ones or one
good and one bad agent receive independent, possibly di⁄erent signals. Given this structure,
the market can update beliefs regarding the agents capabilities not only based on the reports of
both agents taken individually (in combination with Ri if revealed at the end of the game), but
draw inferences from whether both agents emit identical or di⁄erent reports. Identical reports
possibly hint towards identical signals, which are certain to be observed if both agents are good.
All the same, we assume that the signal per se is uninformative with regard to the type of agent.
Put another way, the agents are supposed not to learn anything about their personal type when
observing the signal in isolation. To ensure this we require that the ex ante probability to
observe st and sb is identical for both, the good type and the bad one:
Pr(sijgood) = Pr(sijbad): (1)
For signal st this results in
Pr(stjgood) = Pr(stjbad)
, Pr(stjgood;Rt)Pr(Rt) + Pr(stjgood;Rb)Pr(Rb)
= Pr(stjbad;Rt)Pr(Rt) + Pr(stjbad;Rb)Pr(Rb)
, p￿ + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿) = m￿ + m(1 ￿ ￿)
, p￿ + (1 ￿ p)(1 ￿ ￿) = m: (2)
For signal sb we obtain analogously
(1 ￿ p)￿ + p(1 ￿ ￿) = (1 ￿ m): (3)
Rearranging terms reveals that (2) and (3) are identical.
In what follows we restrict ￿ = 1
2. Doing so eases the analysis and simpli￿es notation consider-
ably. Moreover, it allows to exclude equilibria that are solely driven by a "conform to the prior"
e⁄ect and therefore provide very limited insights. 8 As a consequence we are able to derive a
unique pure strategy herding equilibrium at least for given out of equilibrium beliefs. Assuming
￿ = 1
2 implies m = 1
2.

























The timeline in ￿gure 1 describes the course of the game.
The management sets up possibly biased ￿nancial statements. These are audited by an in-
dependent auditor and an audit committee. Both parties privately receive a signal about the
quality of the ￿nancial statements. As described above, either identical or di⁄erent signals may
be observed. The auditor releases an opinion, which is either Mb or Mt; to the public. Having
observed the auditor￿ s report, the audit committee releases its opinion, again Mb or Mt; based
on both pieces of information, the auditor￿ s report and its own privately observed signal.
After both reports have been observed publicly, with probability q the true character of the
￿nancial statements is learned. At the end of the game the labor market updates its beliefs
regarding the type of the auditor and the audit committee based on all available information
forming rational conjectures about the agents￿reporting strategies.
With regard to the agents￿objectives we contrast two di⁄erent settings: We start with a bench-
mark setting that analyzes the reporting behavior of both agents assuming that neither one cares
about the market￿ s assessment. Both agents try to make truthful and informative statements in
the sense that they report what the information observed indicates.
In the second setting we characterize equilibrium reporting behavior given that reputation con-
cerns matter. The agents are assumed to be interested solely in improving the labor market￿ s
assessment of their own capabilities. Thus they choose their report Mb or Mt in order to in-
￿ uence the market￿ s belief about their type (capability). We demonstrate that this particular
interest distorts reporting incentives and creates herd behavior.
3 Benchmark Setting
3.1 The auditor￿ s choice
In our model the auditor acts ￿rst. He receives a signal si and is required to report on the
quality of the ￿nancial statements based on that signal. He does not know his personal type
and thus whether the signal received is informative. Given he observes si he will report Mi if





7Thus the auditor reports Mi if he personally believes that Ri is more likely than not. For the
special case where Pr(Rijsi) = 1
2 we assume that the auditor aims at passing on his private
information to the market by reporting Mi if he observed si.






Pr(st) = Pr(stjRt)Pr(Rt) + Pr(stjRb)Pr(Rb) (4)
and




(1 ￿ ￿); (5)
Pr(stjRb) = Pr(stjRb;good)Pr(good) + Pr(stjRb;bad)Pr(bad)
= (1 ￿ p)￿ +
1
2
(1 ￿ ￿): (6)
Inserting (5) and (6) into (4) and using Pr(Rt) = ￿ = 1
2 results in



















Proceeding as shown above, we obtain













it is easy to see it holds for p > 0:5.
Thus in our setting an auditor that reports according to his own assessment based on what
he observed will always report what the signal indicates, that is Mb (Mt) if sb (st) has been
observed.
83.2 The audit committee￿ s choice
The audit committee updates its beliefs regarding the management￿ s report based on what it
learns from the auditor￿ s report and its own signal. Knowing that the auditor reports as described
above, the audit committee is able to infer the signal from observing the report. Thus without
reputation concerns the audit committee reports Mi whenever the conditional probability for
Ri is greater than 1
2:
As for the auditor, we assume that an audit committee that attaches identical probabilities to
both types of ￿nancial statements being present, that is Pr(Rij￿;￿) = 1
2; passes on the personally
observed signal to the market by reporting Mi having observed si:













and will report Mb whenever these inequalities are violated.9
Calculating the conditional probabilities as Pr(Rkjsi;sj) =
Pr(Rk;si;sj)
Pr(si;sj) with Pr(Rk;si;sj) =
Pr(si;sjjRk)Pr(Rk),10 we obtain
Pr(Rtjst;st) =
4p￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2
2(1 + ￿2)
Pr(Rtjsb;sb) =
4(1 ￿ p)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)2
2(1 + ￿2)
and











9In what follows the ￿rst signal refers to the auditor￿ s and the second one to the audit committee￿ s observation.
E.g., Pr(Rtjsb;st) denotes the conditional probability for an unbiased report to be present, given that the auditor
has observed sb and the audit committee has observed st.




































0 if si 6= sj
Pr(sijRk;good) if si = sj
.
9and















respectively. While condition (9) holds by assumption, (10) is violated. Thus the audit commit-
tee will report Mt having inferred/observed (st;st) and Mb given (sb;sb). If the signals observed
di⁄er from each other, it will report what its personally observed signal indicates.
4 Reputation concerns
In this section reputation or career concerns are present. Both agents aim at enhancing their rep-













and the observation of the true character of ￿nancial statements R. If R

































, respectively. Recall that AC knows the
other agent￿ s report when it has to report on its audit, while A does not have this information.
Hence, A builds expectations over the observation of R; over the realization of R given it is
observed, and over AC￿ s report. AC only builds expectations over the observation of R and its
realization.
Below we establish that a herding equilibrium exists with herding on the part of the audit
committee. Each player forms rational beliefs about the strategies of the other players which
are correct in equilibrium. To check whether a strategy of a certain player is possibly part of
an equilibrium, we use a ceteris paribus analysis. Thus we take the beliefs and strategies of all
other players as given and assume that they are correctly anticipated by the player considered.
We proceed in three steps.
First we assume that the auditor reports consistently with the signal observed: Mb if he observes
sb and Mt if he observes st:
Second we show that given the auditor￿ s strategy, it is optimal for the audit committee to follow
the auditor￿ s opinion and to replicate his report no matter which signal has been privately
10observed. This strategy turns out to be optimal even though the labor market anticipates such
behavior and thus ignores the report when forming beliefs about AC￿ s ability.11
Finally, we show that given the herding strategy of the audit committee and consistent beliefs
of the market, it is indeed optimal from the auditor￿ s perspective to report what the signal
observed indicates.
According to step one described above, we presume that the auditor reports as in the benchmark
setting. If he does so, the audit committee is able to infer st (sb) from the report Mt (Mb): The
audit committee itself observes either the same signal as the auditor or a di⁄erent one. It
chooses its own report to a⁄ect the market￿ s belief about its type. To start o⁄, we assume that
the market believes both agents behave as described in the benchmark setting. Such behavior
would allow the market to infer the signal each agent observed from the reports and to update
beliefs accordingly. Conditional on whether the labor market learns the true character of the
report R at the end of the game the following revised beliefs ^ ￿
AC
result.
i) If the market has learned R:12
^ ￿
AC




4￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)2 (11)
^ ￿
AC
(st;st;Rb) = ^ ￿
AC
(sb;sb;Rt) =
2￿(1 ￿ p)(1 + ￿)
4￿(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ ￿)2
^ ￿
AC












ii) If the market has not learned R:
^ ￿
AC




1 + ￿2 (12)
^ ￿
AC





This updating rule, however, holds in equilibrium if and only if there is no incentive for the



























for i = b;t.
11This result is similar to the signal-jamming literature, where in equilibrium agents distort signals to in￿ uence
the market￿ s beliefs although the market rationally anticipates distortion of the signal. See Homstr￿m (1982) and
Fischer and Verrecchia (2000).
12See the appendix for detailed description of how ^ ￿
AC
(￿) is calculated.
11Notice that given A follows his signal and the market believes that both agents follow their signals
























i.e. if AC reports truthfully the e⁄ect of R drops out on average. For instance, assume that
the auditor has reported Mt which implies an observation st. The audit committee privately















which can be rewritten as
^ ￿
AC







This inequality, however, is always violated as is shown in lemma 1.
Lemma 1 If the auditor reports the signal observed and the market believes that the audit
committee does so, too, and updates beliefs accordingly, the audit committee has a strict incentive
to always mimic the auditor￿ s report. It reports Mt if the auditor has reported Mt and Mb if the
auditor has reported Mb; no matter what signal si it observed.
Proof. See the appendix.
Corollary 1 There does not exist an equilibrium in which the auditor and the audit committee
report what the signals indicate and the market correctly infers the signals from the reports and
updates accordingly.
Given this result, it is not rational from the market￿ s perspective to believe the audit committee￿ s
report and to update beliefs as demonstrated above. A rational market rather anticipates the
audit committee￿ s incentives. Imitating the auditor￿ s report renders the audit committee￿ s report
completely uninformative. From the market￿ s perspective it can at best be ignored and thus the
prior belief ￿ is used to evaluate AC.
If the market adopts that strategy, we need to check whether it is still optimal for the audit
committee to imitate the auditor. To do so we establish the following natural out of equilibrium
beliefs of the market:
If the market observes a report from the audit committee that di⁄ers from the one the auditor
provided, the market believes that the audit committee reports what the observation of its
private signal indicates, that is Mt (Mb) having observed st (sb).






































which always holds true. The RHS of (15) and (16) is known from the proof of Lemma 1, part
iii) and iv). Accordingly, (15) and (16) are equivalent and can be written as
￿ ￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)













As 8p(1 ￿ p) is less than 2, (15) and (16) are ful￿lled, too.
Even though the market ignores the report and uses its prior belief on AC￿ s type, it remains
optimal from the AC￿ s perspective to mimic the auditor. Put another way, truthful reporting
damages reputation on average as the market interprets di⁄erent reports, implying di⁄erent
signals, as an indicator of bad types.
Summing up, we ￿nd that whenever the auditor reports what the signal he observes indicates,
the audit committee optimally mimics the auditor￿ s report and the market ignores this report
when updating beliefs on the audit committee￿ s type.
It remains to show that it is indeed part of the equilibrium that the auditor reports truthfully
as assumed so far. Given that the audit committee mimics the auditor￿ s report, the market
is unable to infer anything from observing the second report. Thus it will use the auditor￿ s
report as well as the true character of the ￿nancial statements Ri, if revealed, to update beliefs
regarding the auditor￿ s type.
If the market believes the auditor￿ s report and updates accordingly the auditor has no incentive



























This is indeed the case which results in lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The auditor has a strict incentive to report what the signal observed indicates given
that the market anticipates such behavior and updates beliefs accordingly.
13Proof. See the appendix.
Note that the above Lemma holds true for all q 2 (0;1]:
Having completed the three-step analysis described at the beginning of this section, we are able
to state the following result.
Proposition 1 The following strategies constitute an equilibrium: The auditor reports what the
signal observed indicates. The audit committee mimics the auditor￿ s report such that its own
report does not depend on the signal it privately observes. The market anticipates the strategies
of both agents and updates beliefs with regard to their capabilities accordingly. It considers the
auditor￿ s report and ignores the one provided by the audit committee.
The equilibrium derived in Proposition 1 provides a systematic rationale for the lack of op-
position we observe on the part of audit committees. If reputation concerns are present, it
might in particular be rational from the audit committee￿ s perspective not to object to what the
management reports and the auditor con￿rms. These incentives prevail no matter what private
information suggests.
5 Countervailing measures
So far we have assumed that the sole objective of audit committee members is to maximize the
market￿ s perception of their ability. Naturally, the question arises whether other objectives are
likely to exist or can be created via legislation, institutions or contracting. In what follows we
discuss two measures that come to mind in this context: First, we assume that the AC is held
liable for failure by imposing a ￿ne. Second, a reward for good performance is considered.
5.1 Imposing a ￿ne for AC failure
This section covers a setting in which the audit committee is held liable if its report MAC does
not coincide with the subsequently revealed true quality of the ￿nancial statements R. We
extend the model to include a ￿ne ￿ to be paid by the AC if either the AC reports Mt and Rb
is revealed or vice versa.
Accordingly we adapt the AC￿ s objective function to re￿ ect that the AC maximizes some kind








Assume again that the auditor behaves as in the benchmark solution, i.e., he reports what his
signal indicates. By de￿nition if the true character of the ￿nancial statements is not observed
at the end of the period, which happens with probability (1 ￿ q); liability of the AC does not
14apply. Given the true character of ￿nancial statements is learned, AC￿ s expected ￿ne conditional
on both signals and its report is given by
E (￿jsi;sj;Mk) = ￿ Pr(Rljsi;sj;l 6= k)
with i;j;k;l 2 fb;tg. For instance, assume AC has observed signal st and inferred sb from the
auditor￿ s report Mb. If AC reports Mt its expected ￿ne is given by





Given the auditor acts as in the benchmark solution and the market conjectures that both agents
behave like in the benchmark solution, benchmark behavior by AC is induced via a ￿ne ￿ if and





















































From Lemma 1 we know that without any liability considerations, ￿ = 0, conditions i) and ii)
and conditions iii) and iv), respectively, are equivalent. Hence, (19) can be rewritten as
i) A ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjst;sb) ￿ B ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjst;sb) (21)
ii) A ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjsb;st) ￿ B ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;st)
iii) C ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjst;st) ￿ D ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjst;st)
iv) C ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;sb) ￿ D ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjsb;sb) .
with A < B and C > D as known from the proof of Lemma 1:
Proposition 2 Given A reports like in the benchmark setting, there exists no ￿ne ￿ such that
benchmark reporting of AC can be induced as equilibrium behavior.
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that the incentive compatibility conditions i) and ii) refer to a situation in which A and AC
have observed di⁄erent signals si 6= sj. As has been shown above, the conditional probability
Pr(Rkjsi;sj) = 1
2, i;j;k 2 fb;tg. Accordingly, given that R is revealed at all, both, Rt and Rb,
are equally likely to pop up and the expected ￿ne to be paid by the AC is identical, too, no
15matter whether it reports in line with the signal personally observed or not. Technically spoken,
the ￿ne drops out of both sides of the inequality. What is left is identical to our setting without
liability considerations where we have shown that herding incentives are present. Conditions iii)
and iv), in contrast, cover identical observations of both agents. We know from the previous
analysis that ACs that care solely about reputation report what they personally observe and
thus follow the auditor. If a ￿ne is imposed the expected ￿ne is minimized for truthful reporting.
This results from the fact that Pr(Rijsi;si) > Pr(Rjjsi;si);i 6= j: Accordingly, the ￿ne provides
additional incentives to follow the auditor in this setting.
It follows that adding a ￿ne to the objective function of the AC does not at all countervail the
AC￿ s incentives to herd.
5.2 Performance based bonus contracts
To start with the most basic setting let us consider a bonus contract for AC that pays a bonus
￿ > 0 if AC￿ s report MAC coincides with the revealed character of the ￿nancial statements R.
The incentive problem arising from such a bonus o⁄er, however, is structurally very similar to
the one created when a ￿ne is imposed: Speci￿cally, if A and AC observe di⁄erent signals, the
expected bonus to be obtained is identical, no matter whether AC reports what it personally
observes or not. If both agents observe identical signals, the AC maximizes its expected bonus
by reporting in line with the auditor and its personal observation. As a formal analysis would
largely parallel the one above, we omit such an analysis and refer to the previous section.
Alternatively we proceed to allow the compensation contract for AC to depend on its own report
as well as on A￿ s report. We assume that AC obtains a bonus ￿ > 0 if and only if its report
coincides with the true character of the ￿nancial statements and A￿ s report does not coincide
with it. This contract captures that the audit committee will be highly rewarded if it has
completed its tasks in an optimal way: Namely, to e⁄ectively monitor the reporting process and
the auditor.
Given the auditor reports what his signal indicates, AC￿ s expected bonus conditional on both
signals and its report Mk is given by
E (￿jsi;sj;Mk) = ￿ ￿ Pr(Rkjsi;sj;Mk;i 6= k):
Accordingly, the four conditions (see (19) and (21)) that ensure benchmark behavior by AC
assuming A reports truthfully and the market believes that both agents report truthfully are
given by
i) A + q￿ Pr(Rbjst;sb) ￿ B (22)
ii) A + q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;st) ￿ B
iii) C ￿ D + q￿ Pr(Rbjst;st)
iv) C ￿ D + q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;sb) .
16Again conditions i) and ii) cover the case where both agents observe di⁄erent signals. Hence,
AC has only a chance to obtain the bonus if it reports truthfully. Conditions iii) and iv), in
contrast, cover the setting in which AC and A observe identical signals. As by assumption the
auditor reports truthfully the audit committee can only obtain the bonus if it reports contrary
to the signals observed by both agents. The latter e⁄ect potentially counteracts the objective
to motivate truthful reports and may lead to anti-herding by AC.
From previous sections we know that A < B and C > D. Therefore, if ￿ is su¢ ciently high,
one can ensure that i) and ii) are ful￿lled. However, if ￿ becomes too high anti-herding will be
motivated. Hence, ￿ must be not too high to ful￿ll iii) and iv). The question is whether there
exists a set of values for ￿ such that all four conditions are ful￿lled simultaneously.
Lemma 3 If ￿ 2 [￿min;￿max], conditions i)-iv) are ful￿lled, where ￿min ￿
2(B￿A)
q > 0, ￿max
￿ C￿D
q￿ > 0;￿max > ￿min and ￿ ￿ Pr(Rbjst;st) = Pr(Rtjsb;sb).
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 3 shows that there exists a continuum of positive bonuses such that AC can be motivated
to report what its signal indicates rather than to follow the auditor. To avoid that AC will be
induced to misstate its information if both agents observe the same signal there is an upper
bound ￿max for the bonus. To provide AC with incentives to report truthfully if both agents
observe di⁄erent information there is a lower bound ￿min which an appropriate bonus must
exceed.














Proof. See the appendix.
The higher the probability q that the true character of ￿nancial statements will be eventually
observed the lower the lower and the upper bound for an incentive-compatible bonus. With
q increasing a lower bonus is required to motivate truthful reporting if both agents observe
di⁄erent signals in i) and ii). At the same time the maximum feasible bonus that just ensures
that AC reports truthfully if agents observe the same signals decreases as the RHS in iii) and
iv) increases in q. Hence, the upper and the lower bound of incentive-compatible bonuses will
be shifted downwards if q increases. As the marginal e⁄ect on ￿min turns out to be stronger
than on ￿max, the bandwidth of incentive-compatible bonuses is decreasing in q. In contrast, if
p increases the interval [￿min;￿max] is enlarged. The higher the probability p that good types
observe the "correct" signal the lower AC￿ s average gain (B) from herding if both agents observe
di⁄erent signals (A does not depend on p). Therefore, a smaller bonus is required to motivate
truthful reporting. At the same time, AC￿ s gain from anti-herding (D) with identical signals
is decreasing in p such that ￿max increases in p (C does not depend on p). If the ex ante
17probability ￿ of an agent being good increases, the lower and the upper bound for ￿ that allow
to motivate truthful reports increase. The intuition is the following: The higher ￿ the higher
AC￿ s reputational loss (in terms of B ￿A and C ￿D) from deviating from the herding strategy.
This relaxes iii) and iv) but at the same time makes i) and ii) more restrictive.
To establish benchmark reporting by both agents as an equilibrium we ￿nally have to investigate
if the auditor has actually an incentive to report truthfully (as assumed so far) given the audit
committee reports what its signal indicates and assuming benchmark beliefs by the market.
































The ￿rst condition requires that it is optimal for A to report Mb having observed sb: The second
one states that it needs to be optimal to report Mt having observed st. As by assumption AC
reports according to its signal and the market believes that both agents report what their signals







Lemma 5 Given AC reports as in the benchmark solution and the market conjectures benchmark
behavior of both agents, A has an incentive to report like in the benchmark setting.
Proof. See the appendix.
Having shown that it is optimal for the auditor to follow his signal if AC follows its signal, too,
we can state the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 If the bonus for AC is from the interval [￿min;￿max], there exists an equilibrium
in which both agents report in line with the benchmark solution.
6 Conclusion
At least anecdotal evidence suggests that audit committees established by boards tend not
to oppose to dubious accounting practices employed by the management and approved by the
auditor. In this paper we provide a rationale for such behavior. We use a learning model to show
that audit committees may have an incentive to simply mimic the auditor￿ s report and to ignore
relevant private information. Such herding results in a setting in which auditors and audit
committees solely care about reputation. Moreover, "sharing the blame" e⁄ects shield audit
committees from reputational losses. The latter e⁄ect is particularly crucial for our results. The
fact that a failure damages reputation of one agent really hard only if the other one does not fail
renders imitation on the side of the agent acting second, that is the audit committee, optimal.
18This strategy of ensuring that either both or none of the agents fail remains optimal even though
the market anticipates herding behavior and completely ignores the audit committee￿ s report.
Though optimal from the audit committee￿ s perspective, herding is generally undesirable. It
advances fraud to remain undetected which harms shareholders, investors and other stakeholders.
To counteract such misbehavior, various alternatives have been proposed in academia as well as
in politics. We discuss two of the most frequently mentioned options in the ￿nal sections of our
paper: bonus contracts and ￿nes. Importantly, we ￿nd that ￿nes, discussed in many jurisdictions
as a means to legally align incentives, turn out to be unsuitable to avoid herding at all. The
same result is obtained for bonus contracts that solely rely on the audit committee￿ s report. In
contrast, a more sophisticated bonus contract, that ties the bonus to both, the auditor￿ s and
the audit committee￿ s report, turns out to work in our setting.
19Appendix
Derivation of ^ ￿
AC
(￿) in Section 4








We know from Bayes￿rule that Pr(goodjsi;sj;Rk) =
Pr(good,si;sj;Rk)
Pr(si;sj;Rk) . The joint probabilities
































































































0 if si 6= sj
Pr(sijRk;good) if si = sj
.









(si;sj;Rk) from i), ^ ￿
AC
(si;sj) can be calculated as
^ ￿
AC
(si;sj) = ^ ￿
AC
(si;sj;Rb)Pr(Rbjsi;sj) + ^ ￿
AC
(si;sj;Rt)Pr(Rtjsi;sj).
Proof of Lemma 1
To prove Lemma 1 we need to show that there is a strict incentive for the audit committee to
report in line with the auditor, no matter what its privately observed signal suggests. Assume
the market conjectures that both agents report as in the benchmark solution for the whole proof.
The following conditions need to hold:
















(st;st;Rt)Pr(Rtjst;sb) + ^ ￿
AC
(st;st;Rb)Pr(Rbjst;sb)] + (1 ￿ q)^ ￿
AC




20(25) can also be written as
q[
2￿p(1 + ￿)




2￿(1 ￿ p)(1 + ￿)
4￿(1 ￿ p) + (1 ￿ ￿)2
1
2
] + (1 ￿ q)[
￿(1 + ￿)




Writing the latter condition as q [1]+(1 ￿ q)[2] > ￿
1+￿ we prove that this inequality always holds
true by showing that [1] > ￿
1+￿ and [2] > ￿
1+￿. The latter two conditions are ful￿lled if
￿p(1 + ￿)





￿(1 ￿ p)(1 + ￿)










(26) , (27), and (28) can be rewritten to obtain p < 1; p > 0; and 2￿ > 0, respectively. All three
inequalities hold by assumption.
























(29) is equivalent to (25) and thus (29) holds as well.

























1 + ￿2 > q[
2(1 ￿ p)￿
(1 + ￿)
















From (i) we know that
￿(1+￿)
1+￿2 > ￿
(1+￿). To show that (31) holds we show below that
￿(1 + ￿)
1 + ￿2 >
2(1 ￿ p)￿
(1 + ￿)












1 + ￿2￿ ) =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)






(32) can be rewritten as
4￿2 ￿
1 ￿ 2p + 2p2￿
(1 + ￿)
￿
1 + ￿2￿ > 0
which holds true. Accordingly (30) holds true.
























(33) is equivalent to (30) and thus (33) holds as well.
Proof of Lemma 2









(si) = ￿; the latter equality holds as in expectation the e⁄ect of possibly observing R cancels






















(1 ￿ q)￿, inserting on both sides of (17) and (18) results in
￿ ￿ q[
2(1 ￿ p)￿




(1 ￿ ￿) + p￿) +
2p￿




(1 ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ p)￿)] + (1 ￿ q)￿
for both conditions. This inequality can be rewritten to obtain
(
2p￿
2p￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
2(1 ￿ p)￿
2(1 ￿ p)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
)￿(2p ￿ 1) ￿ 0 (34)
As p > 0:5 by assumption (2p ￿ 1) > 0. It remains to show that
2p￿
2p￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
￿
2(1 ￿ p)￿
2(1 ￿ p)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)
which simpli￿es to
p ￿ 1 ￿ p:
This is strictly true by assumption.
Proof of Proposition 2
Incentive compatibility conditions for AC are given by
i) A ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjst;sb) ￿ B ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjst;sb) (35)
ii) A ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjsb;st) ￿ B ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;st)
iii) C ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjst;st) ￿ D ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjst;st)
iv) C ￿ q￿ Pr(Rtjsb;sb) ￿ D ￿ q￿ Pr(Rbjsb;sb)
with A = ￿







+ (1 ￿ q)
￿(1+￿)
1+￿2 ;B > A; and with C =
￿(1+￿)











+ (1 ￿ q) ￿
1+￿;C > D. Note that
Pr(Rtjsb;st) = Pr(Rtjst;sb) = 1








22As B > A i) and ii) are always violated. Conditions iii) and iv) are identical, too. As
Pr(Rijsi;si) > Pr(Rjjsi;si) both are ful￿lled for any ￿ ￿ 0. It follows that herding remains
optimal for any ￿:
Proof of Lemma 3
In (22), conditions i) and ii), and conditions iii) and iv) are equivalent. For conditions i)/ ii)





C ￿ D + q￿￿ (37)
with A, B;C and D as de￿ned in the proof of Proposition 2 above and ￿ ￿ Pr(Rbjst;st) =
Pr(Rtjsb;sb) =
4(1￿p)￿+(1￿￿)2









Conditions (38) and (39) can only be ful￿lled simultaneously if ￿max ￿ ￿min where
￿max ￿ ￿min =
￿8￿2 (2p ￿ 1)Z
￿
4￿p ￿ (1 + ￿)
2
￿￿
4￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)
2
￿
q (1 + ￿)
2 (1 + ￿)
with Z = (2p ￿ 1)
￿





(1 + q + 4qp(p ￿ 1)). Notice that ￿max ￿ ￿min is
positive, if Z is positive. As p > 1=2;(1 + q + 4qp(p ￿ 1)) is always greater than one. Hence,
￿max > ￿min and if ￿ 2 [￿min;￿max], conditions i)-iv) in (22) are ful￿lled.
Proof of Lemma 4





q2 (1 + ￿)
￿








2 (2p ￿ 1)
￿
4￿p ￿ (1 + ￿)
2
￿2 ￿











with Y = (q ￿ 1)
￿
1 + ￿2￿2 + (1 ￿ p)
￿
8￿2p(q ￿ 2) ￿ 4qp
￿
1 + ￿4￿￿
; Y 0 = @Y=@￿
N =
￿
4￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)
2
￿￿




(1 + ￿)q; N0 = @N=@￿:
To prove that ￿￿
min ￿
@￿min
@￿ > 0 we show that it is positive for all q and ￿ at its minimum with





2 > 0 for all q and ￿. Hence,
@￿min
@￿ > 0 for all p;q;￿.

























4￿(1 + q + 4qp(p ￿ 1))
￿
4￿p ￿ 3￿ ￿ 2 + ￿3￿
q (1 + ￿)
2
￿
4￿p ￿ (1 + ￿)
2
￿2 > 0.
To verify the sign of
@￿max
@￿ notice that 4qp(p ￿ 1) is greater than ￿q and 4￿p ￿ 3￿ ￿ 2 + ￿3 is
negative for the maximum value p = 1 for all ￿.
Proof of Lemma 5
Inserting into (23) we obtain













































As both agents are symmetric, it holdsb ￿
A




(si;sj) = b ￿
AC
(si;sj)
with i;j;k 2 fb;tg. The b ￿
AC0
s are given in (11) and (12), respectively.
Using the results from section 3.2 the probabilities Pr(Rk;sjjsi) =
Pr(Rk;sj;si)
Pr(si) and Pr(sjjsi) =
Pr(sj;si)
Pr(si) can be calculated as



























(si;sj) and the probabilities into (40) and (41) we obtain for both
conditions





8￿p(p ￿ 1) ￿ 1 + 2￿ ￿ ￿2￿￿



















We proceed to prove that (42) holds by showing that both X1 and X2 are lower than ￿: From





it follows ￿ > X2: ￿ ￿ X1 can be factorized as
￿ ￿ X1 =
2￿2 ￿
￿￿4 + ￿2 ￿









1 + ￿2￿￿ . (43)
The denominator of (43) is negative as 4p￿ <
￿
1 + ￿2￿
. Hence, (43) is positive, if P = ￿￿4 +
￿2 ￿
32p4 ￿ 20p + 52p2 + 2 ￿ 64p3￿
+4p￿1￿4p2 is negative. We proceed to prove negativity of
P by showing that P is negative for all ￿ at the P-maximizing value for p, i.e., P (p￿ (￿);￿) < 0
for all ￿ 2 (0;1) with p￿ (￿) 2 argmaxp P (p;￿).
From the optimality condition
dP(￿)































dp2 = ￿16(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ + 1) > 0.




= ￿￿4 ￿ ￿2. To search for absolute
maxima we also need to check the function values of P the at the limits of its domain: P (1;￿) =
P (0;￿) = ￿1+2￿2￿￿4. Hence, if 1 < 3￿2 p = 0 and p = 1 are the absolute maximizers of P and
for 1 > 3￿2 p = 1=2 is the absolute maximizer.13In any case, the corresponding function values
￿￿4 ￿ ￿2and ￿1 + 2￿2 ￿ ￿4, respectively, are negative for all ￿ 2 (0;1) such that ￿ ￿ X1 > 0:
Having shown that X1 and X2 are smaller than ￿ it follows ￿ > qX1 +(1 ￿ q)X2 such that (42)
is ful￿lled.
13For 1 = 3￿
2 we have three absolute maximizers:p = 0;p = 1; and p = 1=2:
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